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Was Kekulé’s Mind Brainbound? The Historiography of
Chemistry and the Philosophy of Extended Cognition
Author(s): David Theodore
Source: Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2009) 158-177.
Published by: The University of Toronto
DOI: 10.4245/sponge.v3i1.6125
E D I T O R I A L O F F I C E S
Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology
Room 316 Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1K7
hapsat.society@utoronto.ca
Published online at jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/SpontaneousGenerations
ISSN 1913 0465
Founded in 2006, Spontaneous Generations is an online academic journal
published by graduate students at the Institute for the History and Philosophy
of Science and Technology, University of Toronto. There is no subscription or
membership fee. Spontaneous Generations provides immediate open access to
its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public
supports a greater global exchange of knowledge.
PEER-REVIEWED
Was Kekulé’s Mind Brainbound?
The Historiography of Chemistry and the Philosophy of
Extended Cognition∗†
David Theodore‡
This article examines the revisionist role that current debates and
philosophical positions on extended cognition might play for the
historian of science, and uses as its case study August Kekulé’s
formulation of the benzene molecule’s structure, including the
dreams that Kekulé reported as the origin of his model. It builds
on the notion of engaging philosophical positions through the
historiography of nineteenth-century chemistry, but also examines
some of the implications of the history of science for extended
cognition. While an extended cognition approach to Kekulé’s use
of graphics and visual materials is promising, I argue that there
is less usefulness for the idea of collective cognition. Instead
I advocate using detailed historical studies to test theories of
extended cognition.
This article examines the revisionist role that current debates and
philosophical positions on extended cognition might play for the historian
of science, and uses as its case study August Kekulé’s formulation of the
benzene molecule’s structure, including the dreams that Kekulé reported
as the origin of his model. It builds on the notion of engaging philosophical
positions through the historiography of nineteenth-century chemistry (Gay
1976; Gay 1978), but also, more ambitiously, examines some of the
implications of the history of science for extended cognition.
I take extended cognition to be the idea that human beings think by
opportunistically making two-way links–links that can sustain “systematic
causal interactions”–with either non-biological exogenous resources or
other human beings or both (Churchland 1984, 22). Andy Clark, whose
writing about of extended cognition I will rely on here, has argued
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for the philosophical usefulness of this idea since an article on “The
Extended Mind” he co-authored with David Chalmers in 1998 (Clark and
Chalmers 1998; the article is included as an appendix to Supersizing,
Clark 2008). Clark and Chalmers contrast extended cognition with two
standard interpretations of cognition. The first position claims that thinking
is trapped inside our head, so that what lies outside the body lies outside
the mind. Following Clark’s terminology, I will refer to this position as
“intercranial” or “brainbound.” They also acknowledge a second tradition
in philosophy of mind, externalism, whose proponents argue that since
meaning and language are to some extent dependent on the external
world, so must be the mind. Extended cognition goes one step further.
Clark and Chalmers argue that external states and processes, material
and symbolic, are active, tightly-coupled parts of a cognitive “system.”
The world external to the individual not only supports cognition, or can
be instrumentally manipulated as a tool, but actually “drives cognitive
processes” (Clark 2008, 220). If external processes in a cognitive system
are indistinguishable from “internal” ones, they argue, then the boundary
of the skull is artificial, and we gain explanatory power by extending
cognition beyond the brain and into the world. I will refer to this position
as “extended.”
Clark distinguishes two strong research programs in extended
cognition. One would try to explain how minds (“specific cognitive agents”)
persist. The other would try to understand the components and boundaries
of whatever system of agent-plus-environment “underpins” an agent’s
specific cognitive performance (Clark 2008, 116-18). Clark argues that
option two has more interest for the philosophy of mind, and will perhaps
be more likely to contribute to and take advantage of developments
in cognitive science, whether in further studies of neurobiology or in
understanding the coupled interactions between embodied brains and
the environment, or even in coming to grips with longer time spans of
development and evolution (Clark 2008, 218-19). Histories of particular
scientific events might prove good cases for testing the appropriateness of
extended accounts of the interaction between scientists and their physical
and social environments.
At the same time, however, I also find persuasive Lawrence Shapiro’s
plea (2008) that if we cannot conceive ways to make claims for
an extended mind–and not just for a temporarily spatially extended
system–something valuable about the extended mind program gets lost.
As Clark and Chalmers claim, “There are obvious consequences for
philosophical views of the mind and for the methodology of research
in cognitive science, but there will also be effects in the moral and
social domains” (Clark 2008, 232). In particular, for the historian of
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science, I will argue that Kekulé’s example shows that there is no
outstanding value in renaming certain configurations of research teams
and experimental instruments as extended cognitive systems, rather than
socially-coordinated collectives.
The caveat, however, is that recent historians of science have already
developed quite sophisticated procedures for including the material and
the social in the history of science (Knorr Cetina 1999; Pickering 1995;
Bijker, Hughes, and Pince 1987; Latour 1987; Shapin and Schaffer 1985).
Peter Galison’s examination of the material culture of twentieth-century
physics, Image and Logic, testifies to the power of historical rather than
philosophical method. That is, his account of the interaction between cloud
chambers, laboratory spaces, and physicists deftly explains how scientific
instruments embody both theoretical and practical knowledge, linking
scientists and their environment. Galison never suggests, however, that
the machine is part of a physicist’s mental state; it is something physicists
think with, or an historical document of knowledge and practice (1997, 75).
For recent historians science is indeed spread out among people, places
and things; in Andrew Pickering’s phrase they are “mangled” together.
Extended cognition holds the potential of explaining why they are so
mangled. If somehow we could see collective systems not merely as
distributed but as forming cognitive agents, we would have a potentially
powerful conceptual tool to re-think and rewrite much of Western scientific
history.
Kekulé’s story is a suitable test case for three reasons. First, Kekulé’s
dreams are often described as the paradigmatic example of science being
done by someone thinking through entirely internal processes. His dreams
are part of the history of science, but also of psychological studies of
creativity, psychotherapy, and pop culture. This literature primarily sees
Kekulé’s creativity as an heroic activity; extended cognition can allow
us to test whether a non-heroic non-individualist account is appropriate
here. Second, historians have treated him as an exemplar of scientific
creativity, meaning that his mind, his thinking, was brainbound. Yet there
are important parts of those historical accounts that might be better
explicated through a philosophy of extended cognition: his emphasis on
graphical and pictorial tools constitutes an attempt to make a case for
the usefulness of pictures and symbolisms. Third and, more broadly, the
benzene theory depends on a distributed community of scientists. Overall,
I wish to show that while an extended cognition approach to Kekulé’s use of
graphics and visual materials is promising, there is less usefulness for the
idea of collective cognition. Instead historians’ accounts of group science
may provide empirical cases to test theories of extended cognition.
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I. KEKULÉ’S DREAMS
The case of scientific creativity I have in mind is the oft-told story of
German chemist August Kekulé’s dreams (Brock 1996; Anschutz 1929).
In 1865 and 1866, Kekulé published three papers that established the first
viable theory of the benzene molecule’s structure, opening up the whole
field of aromatic compounds to scientific investigation. Indeed, in 1898
Francis Japp claimed that three quarters of “modern” organic chemistry
could be traced to Kekulé’s theory (Japp 1898; Rocke 1992, 145). It was
not, however, until 1890 that Kekulé had publicly told the stories reporting
how he came up with the theory while dreaming, stories that have become
a mainstay in discussions of scientific creativity. Kekulé published them in
a written version of the speech he gave at the Benzolfest, a twenty-fifth
anniversary celebration of his first paper on the theory hosted by the
German Chemical Society in Berlin:
During my stay in London I resided for a considerable time
in Clapham Road in the neighborhood of the Common. I
frequently, however, spent my evenings with my friend Hugo
Müller at Islington, at the opposite end of the giant town.
We talked of many things, but oftenest of our beloved
chemistry. One fine summer evening I was returning by the
last omnibus, “outside,” as usual, through the deserted streets
of the metropolis, which are at other times so full of life. I fell
into a reverie (Träumerei), and lo, the atoms were gamboling
before my eyes! Whenever, hitherto, these diminutive beings
had appeared to me, they had always been in motion; but up
to that time I had never been able to discern the nature of their
motion. Now, however, I saw how, frequently, two smaller atoms
united to form a pair; how a larger one embraced two smaller
ones; how two still larger ones kept hold of three or even four
of the smaller; whilst the whole kept whirling in a giddy dance. I
saw how the larger ones formed a chain, dragging the smaller
ones after them, but only at the ends of the chain. I saw what
our Past Master, Kopp, my highly honoured teacher and friend,
has depicted with such charm as his “Molekularwelt”; but I saw
it long before him. The cry of the conductor: “Clapham Road,”
awakened me from my dreaming; but I spent part of the night
in putting on paper at least the sketches of those dream forms.
This was the origin of the Structurtheorie. (Rothenberg 1995,
423-24)
Kekulé stressed in the speech that dream-concepts should not be given
credence until examined by someone fully awake. Note, also, that although
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he designates this moment as the origin of his theory, this is not the first or
last time that similar Träumerei and similar visions occurred. Apparently,
such thinking methods were habitual for him. One story, his crucial vision
of dancing snakes has burst out of the history of chemistry into psychology
and even pop culture:
During my sojourn in Ghent in Belgium I occupied an elegant
bachelor apartment on the main street. My study, however, was
located in a narrow side lane and during the day had no light.
For a chemist, who spends daylight hours in the laboratory, this
was no disadvantage. There I sat, writing on my textbook; but
it wasn’t going right; my mind was on other things. I turned the
chair to face the fireplace and slipped into a languorous state.
Again atoms fluttered before my eyes. Smaller groups stayed
mostly in the background this time. My mind’s eye, sharpened
by repeated visions of this sort, now distinguished larger figures
in manifold shapes. Long rows, frequently linked more densely;
everything in motion, winding and turning like snakes. And lo,
what was that? One of the snakes grabbed its own tail and the
image whirled mockingly before my eyes. I came to my senses
as though struck by lightning; this time, too, I spent the rest of
the night working out the results of my hypothesis. (Rothenberg
1995, 424-25)
There have been several sustained scholarly attacks on the veracity
of Kekulé’s account, arguing that he was guilty even of outright lying and
falsification (Wotiz 1993; Vanderbilt 1975; Wotiz and Rudofsky 1984). In
The Kekulé Riddle, John H. Wotiz and Susanna Rudofsky argue: “The
content of this, and most of the other chapters in this book, should
correct and end the many outrageously erroneous stories originating from
the Kekulé dream anecdote. . . and thus dispel the Kekulé Myth and the
Kekulé Dream-Paradigm once and for all. The chapters also show that
there is no justification for using the Kekulé dream anecdotes for the
understanding of the creative process of the human mind” (1993, 267).
Historian Alan J. Rocke, however, who has carried out the most detailed
study to date of the early (i.e. pre-1866) elaboration of the theory, has
responded to most of the criticisms, arguing that “the amount of detail
included in [the anecdotes] suggests that they happened pretty much as
Kekulé described them, nor do we have any persuasive grounds to accuse
him of deliberate falsification” (Rocke 1985, 356). We can assume, then, as
do most students of scientific creativity, that the incidents actually occurred
much as Kekulé reports. In other words, I do not take on the additional
burden of trying to argue that Kekulé made up the idea of thinking while
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dreaming, or that cognition in Kekulé’s instance took place unconsciously.
I instead concentrate on the connections between the extended cognition
program and the historiography of science.
In the rest of this short paper I will deal with the details of Kekulé’s
science only as need arises. What I want to do next is look at three linked
issues: a) Kekulé as exemplar of scientific creativity, b) Kekulé’s work with
diagrams and paper, and c) Kekulé’s theory as a collective achievement.
A) Scientific creativity as cognition
Psychologists and historians assume that Kekulé’s work was creative,
and that they can use the benzene episodes as test cases for their
definitions and theories about creativity. The whirling-snake dream,
in particular, is an epitome in the psychology of scientific creativity
(Gruber 1981; Gruber 2005; Rothenberg 1995, 419). For instance, the
anecdotes constitute an important conceptual position in Arthur Koestler’s
impressionistic but influential 1964 book The Act of Creation. Koestler
named the whirling-snake vision “the most important dream in history
since Joseph’s seven fat and seven lean cows” (1964, 118, 170). Margaret
Boden claims that there is widespread agreement, at least among
psychologists, that discussing creativity means attending to how novel
ideas are “generated” in “individuals’ heads” through “novel combinations
(or extensions) of familiar ideas” (Boden 2005, 484). “The key question,”
she adds, “is how it is possible for new ideas to arise in someone’s mind.”
That Kekulé’s creative moment was a dream reinforces this version of
creativity, in that dreaming is a mental activity that one person does alone,
and that it seems to be a private, brainbound experience. For Boden,
though, studies in neuroscience and psychology show that creativity is not
a special capacity innate to only certain human beings, but rather arises
from everyday cognitive practices such as memory and perception (Boden
2005, 480). Creativity then, is paradoxical, involving a kind of thinking
that derives the unusual from the usual, the novel from the common. In
considering the role of education in forming scientific creativity, Thomas
Kuhn emphasized just this continuity between innovative and traditional
thinking (Kuhn 1963). Thus scientific creativity is studied as a both a
subset of creativity and as a way of understanding what science is and how
science proceeds, progresses, and is taught (Taylor and Barron, 1963).
This description of creativity helps explain why Kekulé’s dreams are
so widely cited as a case study. First, his creative experiences–his
dreams–are self-reported, so that we obtain insight into his internal mental
processes, into his “individual head.” In part the dreams’ reputation is
based on the scarcity of such self-reported accounts; there are remarkably
few documented claims of dream-generated creative ideas in all of
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artistic and scientific history reported “by the creative people themselves”
(Rothenberg 1995, 420-21).1 This scarcity makes the popularity and
tenacity of Kekulé’s dreams all the more striking. That is, rather than being
seen as extraordinary and atypical, Kekulé’s self-reported experience is
taken as exemplary and typical for “creativity” in general, in science,
art, and elsewhere. Second, Kekulé’s structure theory and benzene ring
dreams have persistently been characterized as creative because they
are speculative hypotheses: there was no contemporaneous experimental
evidence that could have supported Kekulé’s guess. As Rocke writes,
“the dearth of appropriate evidence [ca. 1865-66] prevented him from
establishing his views in anything like definitive form” (1985, 379). In this
sense his proposals were mental representations, rather than material
artifacts. Historians, including Rocke, describe the dreams as a mental
rather than physical scientific representation–the elaboration of benzene
theory is presented as a story of theoretical achievement, and not
experimental material culture.
Clark’s thinking on extended cognition helps us understand the material
dimensions of Kekué’s theory because a) it foregrounds the role of
extraorganismic representations and b) it helps us to understand creativity
qua cognition as a transformative link to external conditions, in which
cognition is embedded, rather than as an ex-nihilo internal invention. The
two concepts are closely coupled. Psychotherapist Carl Jung, for example,
categorized the dream-vision as an instance of the mystic marriage;
through the continuity of this mental imagery, Jung argued that traditional
alchemical thought provided the ground for modern scientific chemistry.2
For Jung, Kekulé did not create the image in a vision; the image exists,
a priori, in all human beings. Jung writes: “Thus Kekulé’s vision of the
dancing couples, which first put him on the track of the structure of certain
carbon compounds, namely the benzene ring, was surely a vision of the
coniunctio, the mating that had preoccupied the minds of the alchemists
for seventeen centuries” (Jung 1954, 168). Jung argues that dreaming
provided access to shared mental imagery that, by focusing and fixing the
1My personal favourites among self-reported instances of creative dreaming come
from pop music: a) Paul McCartney’s report of having written “Yesterday,” the most
covered song of the twentieth century, while sleeping, and b) Johnny Cash’s report of
first “hearing” his breakthrough arrangement of “Ring of Fire,” ornamented with Mexican
trumpets, while dreaming.
2Images have histories (even if not all those histories can be traced to Jungian
archetypes!). James Elkins (1999, 156) makes a similar point about images in
twentieth-century science in a discussion of Galison’s Image and Logic (1997): “It
turns out,” Elkins writes, “that some of the most purely ‘logical’ and ‘homologous’ (in
Galison’s sense) contemporary scientific diagrams are closely indebted to medieval and
Renaissance mystical schemata.”
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scientist’s attention, works “effectively in the material world” (Jung 1954,
169).
There is another way in which
Figure 1: Kekulé’s list of nineteen
formulas for acetic acid published in
Lehrbuch der Organischen Chemie
(1861).
mental imagery may be shared among
a community. In her book The Creative
Mind, now in its second edition (2004),
Margaret A. Boden argues that the
computational versions of cognition
developed in artificial intelligence can
shed light on how creativity works, and,
conversely, that looking closely at the
mechanisms of creativity in specific
instances can also advance computing
models of cognition. Using Kekulé as
an important example, Boden claims
that creative ideas simply do not make
sense without a “sociocultural context”:
they cannot be recognized as important
or developed without being embedded
in institutional and cultural communities.
She adds that this interdependence
between individual creativity and culture
is particularly true in the case of science: “The sociocultural context
(ranging from the creator’s personal friends and acquaintances to the
wider society) provides the styles of thought and most of the specific ideas
required for an individual to think creatively. . . . In general, an individual’s
peer group is much more important in the generation of his or her ideas
than is recognized by heroic, neo-Romantic accounts of creativity” (Boden
2004, 483). For Boden, a creative idea is embedded socially, but moreover
it also changes the social setting in which it is embedded. This claim
moves towards Clark’s more radical insistence on our manifold ability to
perform “self-engineering” (2008, 59-60) on both our cognitive tools and
our environment. In Kekulé’s case, the dream arose from familiarity with
contemporary problems in chemistry (how atoms might explain chemical
phenomena), and the vision in turn engineered a new tool that solved
and then re-oriented those problems (towards manipulating carbon-chain
compounds). This notion of embeddedness seems to serve the historian
well, providing a serviceable version of the constitutive relations of
environment and cognition (i.e. one that is more useful than the Kuhnian
notion of an “essential tension” between tradition and innovation precisely
to the extent the latter preserves a heroic, neo-Romantic attitude to
scientific achievement; Kuhn 1963).
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B) Benzene theory’s material symbols
Kekulé’s work is immersed in problems of symbolic representations
(Francoeur 1997; Ramsay 1974; Wieninger 1998). Historian Pierre Laszio
claims even that the chemist’s life was dominated by how to represent
chemical reactions by formulas (1979, 1019-20). Kekulé himself argued
that his early studies in architecture gave him an “irresistible need” for
visualization (Anschutz 1929, 994).3 In 1867 Kekulé published an article
in the London-based journal Laboratory on the conceptual usefulness
of the atom. The article was meant to have two follow-ups, including
one on graphic formulae (Brock 1996, 121; article rpt. in Anschutz 1929,
364-69). The link, for Kekulé, was clear: thinking about chemistry meant
visualization, which in turn meant worrying about how chemistry looks
when written down. This in turn provides a connection to Clark’s argument,
based on research in a variety of disciplines, that the materiality of symbols
provides “simple affect-reduced, perceptual targets” (2008, 45) that reduce
the “descriptive complexity of the scene” (2008, 46; see also Griesemer
2000, 3). Kekulé’s interest in graphic imagery, then, might be better told as
a story grounded in Clark’s insistence that we see how representational
symbolic systems, especially language, give us the “capacity to control
and guide the shape and contents of our own thinking” (2008, 44).
In Kekulé’s tale, thought clearly depends on language, writing,
and paper as means for developing and exploring–elaborating and
clarifying–the dream-visions. Recall his recollections: “The cry of the
conductor: ‘Clapham Road,’ awakened me from my dreaming; but I spent
part of the night in putting on paper at least the sketches of those dream
forms,” and “this time, too, I spent the rest of the night working out the
results of my hypothesis.” The eureka! moment consists of a vision. As
Rothenberg puts it, “the breakthrough conception of the snake with its tail
in its mouth was an organized mental image” (1995, 434). It’s an image
that in Boden’s words led to “a historically new conceptual space” (2004,
71).
There are two strands to Kekulé’s interest in graphics germane here,
the development of the hexagonal benzene ring and the development
of symbolism for chemical structures. They are somewhat difficult to
separate, because these symbol systems act and interact as both abstract,
conceptual devices and as representations of physical systems. Graphic
visualizations allow chemists to work out chemical problems without
physical experimentation, a result derided by Hermann Kolbe as “paper
3Kekulé wrote: “ein unwiderstehliches Bedürfniss nach Anschaulichkei.” Rocke (1985,
377) translates this as “irresistible need for graphic imagery.”
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Figure 2: Kekulé’s “sausage models” from August Kekulé, Bulletin de la Société Chimique
de France 3, no. 98 (1865).
and pencil chemistry” (Nye 1996, 131). Nye adds that paper chemistry
“allowed a chemist to predict both derivatives and isomers, based on
the equivalent atomicities or valences of atoms, without leaving the desk.
The graphical possibilities were endless and they provided innumerable
hypotheses for laboratory investigations” (Nye 1996, 131). This debate
about the value of paperwork is not unique to the debate about aromatics.
Cambrosio, Keating and Jacobi, for example, show that immunologists
Paul Ehrlich faced similar derision (and acceptance) in using graphical
representations to develop and explain his theories (Cambrosio, Jacobi,
Keating 1993, 682).
Kekulé was clear that his
Figure 3: Diagrams of glucose from French
and English versions of Archibald Couper,
“On a New Chemical Theory,” Philosophical
Magazine [4] 16 (1858): 104-16.
graphics did not represent the
spatial positions of molecules,
but rather described how the
atomicity (valency) structures
worked. The advantage, in





chemists to develop “otherwise
unattainable kinds of expertise”
(2008, 55, 44). But it should
not overshadow the standard and
less radical story of terminological clarification. Kekulé published a famous
list (see Figure 1, page 165) of the number of different ways chemists
wrote out the formula for acetic acid, which made communication (and
theoretical manipulation) difficult.
Kekulé advanced thinking on two major graphic symbolic problems.
The first, associated with the omnibus dream, was the question of how
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to represent chemical formulas and molecular constitution (Nye 128-33;
Thuillier 1986; David, 1945). Kekulé’s structural theory argued that atoms
link up to from molecules on the basis of their atomicity values, and that in
particular carbon is “tetratomic” and can form links with itself. How then to
represent the links? Kekulé proposed a “sausage” formula, where rounded
masses graphically bulge at the link points (see Figure 2, page 167).
A few weeks later, Scots chemist Archibald Scott Couper proposed
using dotted lines and then straight lines (see Figure 3, page 167), a visual
device that lead to the verbal terminology of “chemical bonds.” By 1864
Alexander Crum Brown had worked out the notation still used today (see
Figure 4, page 169).4
Kekulé’s second visual contribution, associated with the fireside dream,
was the idea of a hexagonal benzene ring (Rocke 19; Brush 1999). In
Kekulé’s 1866 paper “On the Constitution of Aromatic Substances,” he
proposed that aromatics, of which benzene (or “benzol”) is the simplest,
were formed of a nucleus of six carbon atoms in a closed chain with
alternating double and single bonds (see Figure 5, page 171).
Kekulé’s students experimented with a hexagonal sausage-like model
of the interlocking nucleus, but the standard hexagon representation was
invented by Adolf Claus, who claimed to get it from Kekulé (Brock 1993,
264-67).
C) Benzene theory and collective cognition
I argued in section A that extended cognition helps clarify Kekulé’s work
as a sociocultural phenomenon, rather than as a bounded intercranial
event. The next step is to see whether extended cognition actually
contributes to understanding that phenomenon. The previous section
discussed the integration of the individual scientist with graphics and
symbols; in this section I will look at the ways the individual scientist might
be part of a collective system. The question then arises whether a group
of scientists working on a common topic can have a collective mental
state. Can cognition, in this case, the elaboration of a scientific theory, be
socially distributed and collectively organized? Again, there are two closely
coupled questions: a) can a mind extend across individuals and artifacts?
and b) can a cognitive system extend across individuals and artifacts?
The turn here is from a consideration of how a scientist thinks to
consideration of the question of whether scientists can think together.
If one finds compelling any of Clark’s examples of integrated systems
(i.e. examples where non-biological systems and biological components
4For more diagrams and other models from the 1860s, see
www.chem.yale.edu/ chem125/125/history/models/models.html.
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together form a “cognitive profile”; Clark 2008, 99), then one begins
to accept the position that cognition, whatever it is exactly, involves
the body in an extracranial social and physical environment (Wheeler
2005, 11). But there are also defenders of the “orthodoxy” who claim
that “there are principled reasons for believing that the kind of cognitive
processing cognitive psychologists care about is, essentially without
real-world exception, intracranial” (Adams and Aizawa 2008, 9; see also
Rupert 2004). There does not (yet) seem to be a resolution to this
debate. Arguments against distributed cognition claim that there is no
value to positing collective mental states that are something other than the
mental states of the individuals who make up the collective (see Rupert
2005; Bennett and Hacker 2003). But Bryce Huebner shows that such
arguments against understanding cognition as a system constituted, if
only temporarily, by a heterogeneous hybrid of brains, bodies, artifacts and
environments are too strong, since they also constitute arguments against
individual mental states (Huebner 2008, 109-10).
Figure 4: Alexander Crum Brown, chemical structural diagrams, from “On the
Classification of Chemical Substances, by Means of Generic Radicals,” Transactions of
the Royal Society of Edinburgh 24 (1867): 331-9.
Kekulé’s case allows us to approach these questions at an angle. The
new approach asks: if we accept the premise of collective (or distributed)
cognition (or mind), in what ways should we (or could we) then re-write
the history of benzene theory? We can clearly give a sociological account
of Kekulé’s dreams in terms of his biography, institutional affiliations, and
intellectual traditions; but can we give a non-sociological account in which
the cognitive process of creating Structurtheorie is distributed across
multiple individuals and artifacts?
Answering these questions is to a large degree historical, not
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philosophical work. Indeed it is not, in 2009, controversial to state that
Kekulé’s theories are actually the result of interactions among a number
of chemists working on a number of problems related to atomicity and
aromatics. Russell D. Larsen (1993), for instance, argues that structure
theory clearly represents an example of multiple discovery. In the previous
section I argued that a number of scientists worked out simultaneously
symbols for the benzene ring and chemical formulae. In both these
instances, the idea of collective work is strong. The term “chemical
structure,” for instance, seems to be the invention of Russian chemist
Mikhailovich Butlerov. Overall, historians have identified a number of
chemists and students whose contributions are critical to what are
commonly known as Kekulé’s ideas (Rocke 1984, 261-86).5 Alan J. Rocke
argues for a “gradualist” interpretation, noting (in detail) that the theory
was developed only gradually, in continuity with previous theories, and
only through “subtle reciprocal interactions of hypothesis and experiment”
(Rocke 1985, 357). Kekulé himself realized that some kind of group
contribution was necessary and desirable. He wrote in a letter: “A great
deal is in the works; the plans are unlimited, for the aromatic theory is an
inexhaustible treasure-trove. Now when ‘German youths’ need dissertation
topics, they will find plenty of them here” (quoted in Rocke 1985, 370).6 In
short, even without the thesis of extended cognition, it is necessary to
step back from the singularity of Kekulé’s reverie on that omnibus from
Islington to Clapham Road, and instead recognize the historical evidence
for collective formulation of benzene’s structure.
Still collective activity is neither evidence nor argument for the stronger
claim that scientific creativity is collective cognition. Indeed, Rocke’s
analysis works only by imagining individual, brainbound scientists who
work alone, sharing information through publications, demonstrations and
conferences (Brush 1999, 23). The question of collective activity is most
5Two quotes from Rocke can serve as summaries of the social connections I have in
mind: “The rise of structure theory is as convoluted a subject as the discovery of energy
conservation; in both cases a number of scientists simultaneously contributed bits and
pieces of the picture that eventually emerged, and in both cases it was not apparent that
many of the contributors were even talking about the same set of concepts until after the
dust had settled” (1992, 273). “Even when one steps back from the heat of battle and
soberly considers relative merits, an unequivocal decision as to who was the originator
of valence cannot be made. Frankland was correct in saying that his law requires little
modification to convert it into a modern statement of valence. Nevertheless, Kekulé was
correct in asserting that the modern concept derives directly from the Williamson-Kekulé
school, Frankland’s work being essentially without influence, and this in fact explains
the chemical world’s neglect of Frankland. Valence was discovered independently and in
different contexts by two theoretical schools; Frankland’s statement has technical priority,
but Williamson’s and Kekulé’s proved more fertile and influential” (1992, 280).
6Kekulé to Baeyer, 10 April 1865, Kekulé Sammlung, Darmstadt.
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Figure 5: Benzene ring from Kekulé’s Lehrbuch der organischen Chemie. Note that the
hexagon is not regular, and that the carbon atoms are depicted as round atoms (i.e. not
simply reduced to letters), and that they sit in the middle of the sides of the hexagon, not
at the corners as in Alexander Crum Brown’s version (and in typical “Kekulé diagrams”
today).
often poised as a controversy of priority (Gay 1978; Merton 1957). Rocke,
for instance, even though he notes that structure theory “was approached
nearly simultaneously by several scientists from different directions,” wants
the historian to “reach impartial judgements on the relative merits of
the protagonists,” not to imagine that simultaneous discovery implies a
shared cognitive system (Rocke 1981, 28). Historians are clearly aware
that the development and working out–the “elaboration”–of Kekulé’s theory
involved a community of scientists, but working together does not mean
thinking together, but simply conjugating multiple instances of brainbound
thinking plus social communication.
At issue is whether designating such collective work as cognition would
only amount to what M. Sheets-Johnstone calls (in a different context) a
“lexical band-aid” (quoted in Clark 2008, 217). Whether writing the story of
sociological cooperation or a cognitive system, the historian must search
out and trace out the actual connections, links, communication, and so
on between the parts of the collective. There is no obvious advantage to
saying “cognition is distributed across the collective” when it can be treated
by purely orthodox ideas of brainbound cognition plus communication.
One stumbling block is that for historians, there is a lingering need
to identify agency, not simply to describe collective systems. Take,
for example the recent discussion of high-energy particle physics in
Karin Knorr Cetina’s book Epistemic Cultures (1999). Ronald N. Giere
(2002) explores the idea that research in big science centers on
the experiment itself, not the individual scientists in the group. Giere
acknowledges that there is distributed cognition in such situations,
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distributed heterogeneously among people and artifacts, but argues that
there is no need to image the collective as an epistemic agent: “Individuals
cannot produce the knowledge in question, but they can in a completely
ordinary sense consciously come to know the final result” (2002, 7; this
point is elaborated in detail in Giere, 2006.) Another way of putting it is that
we can only ask the collective certain kinds of questions; otherwise, we
get responses that are identifiable strictly and clearly with an individual, or
no response at all.
So is big science a cognitive change or a sociological development?
Knorr Cetina wants to use the extended view to differentiate two ways
of making knowledge, one used by molecular biologists and a second
used by high-energy physicists. But the outcome of accepting an extended
view is that both types of scientists would be using extended processes.
Therefore, there is no way to use an extended account to differentiate. As
Giere writes, “The cognitive powers of both fields depend upon distinctive
distributed cognitive systems,” a formulation that still differentiates between
intra-human cognitive systems and human-artifact systems (2002, 8).
Likewise, it seems that sociological criteria are better than cognitive ones
for historical periodization. Kekulé and his peers simply did not believe in
extended cognition; it would seem unscholarly to re-write their interactions
in a way so strange to their self-understanding, without some hope that
we have therefore better–and not merely different–version of the story. In
short, even if distributed cognition turns out to be the best description of
how thinking happens in group science, the Kekulé example hints that such
descriptions confer no advantage to the historian. Reciprocally, the thesis
of extended collective cognition must be decided on grounds other than
historical examples.
II. FROM ISLINGTON TO. . .
I started this brief paper by saying I wanted to know whether the notion
of scientific creativity would provide an appropriate if tentative proving
ground for confronting the methods and concepts of extended cognition
with practices in the history of science. By way of conclusion, I would like
to briefly highlight some of the results of that confrontation. They include:
Questions of terminology acerbate the problem of bridging work on the
psychology of scientific creativity, the philosophy of extended cognition,
and the history of chemistry. If there is no robust and useful definition
of cognition, then it is difficult to know the limits of cognition. Under
certain definitions–such as Clark’s–all cognition is by definition extended:
“The intelligent process just is the spatially and temporally extended one
which zigzags between brain, body, and world” (Clark 2002, 132). My
account of Kekulé’s use of graphics demonstrates the potential usefulness
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to historians in Clark’s position but perhaps only by reducing “cognitive
extension” from a movement to a lexical band-aid.
In Kekulé’s case, the use of the term cognition is misleading because
there is no simple identifiable cognitive task. So with a historical
development–the elaboration of Structurtheorie, the concept of the
benzene ring–what is needed is a more broad conception of intelligence
and perhaps even consciousness (certainly of agency) to come to terms
with the complexity of thinking. As Huebner, puts it: “making sense of
a system as fulfilling a particular cognitive function is only possible by
making reference to a particular task and a contrast class” (2008, 107).
On these terms it is difficult to make sense of Kekulé’s dreams, which
“self-engineered” their own tasks. That is, Kekulé’s dreams have no
more agency than Kekulé possesses. So we could use extended cog
as our means to test whether a non-heroic non-individualist account of
creativity is appropriate here, although doing so will require historical
research into the “system”: the ineliminable, tightly coupled elements
cannot be identified merely through inspection of the argument but rather
require knowledge of social networks, communication, material cultures
and chronologies.
The advances in understanding extended cognition may best come
through empirical, not conceptual research programs. New definitions
of cognition derived from studies in cognitive science approached from
embedded, situated perspectives might make the category of “creativity”
obsolete. Indeed, one infectious facet of Clark’s project is the idea that
a whole range of terminology that unreflectively prioritizes brainbound
vocabularies might be dropped or significantly modified once the domain
of cognition is re-conceptualized (i.e. cognitive systems studied as
heterogeneous hybrids that, however temporarily, cross brain, body, and
environment). Historians can use extended cognition to test whether
concepts such as “scientific creativity” are appropriate.
Finally, and most importantly, even though Kekulé had a self-identified
predilection for thinking with images, the existing scholarship still makes
visualization and the examination of graphic material as material symbol
only a small part of the story. Kekulé himself gives us the clue not to
think of the dream visions as primordial, but rather his use of paper and
quest for symbolic manipulation. Extended cognition, then, alerts us to the
materiality of Kekulé’s dream, and offers insight into how to make a close
examination of his graphical practices.
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